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TOWARD DUE PROCESS IN
INJUNCTION PROCEDURE
Doug Rendleman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

FIVE recent Illinois cases illustrate the law of collateral attack on
injunctions.
These decisions not only reveal the strengths of the
present law, but also the confusion, complexity, and inutility of the
doctrine which currently exists. This article will discuss the existing
law, point out problems, and suggest an analysis which will clarify the
law and allow it to serve the underlying social interests.
II. THE PRESENT LAW
City of Chicago v. King' grew out of Martin Luther King's civil
rights activity in Chicago in August 1966. Several major disturbances
had resulted from a series of planned demonstrations in different Chicago neighborhoods at approximately the same time. These demonstrations attracted large, hostile crowds which allegedly endangered the
persons and property of the marchers and other citizens. Thereafter
the police sought an injunction because they were concerned about unreasonable waste of police manpower. On August 19, following a
hearing, a temporary injunction was awarded to the plaintiffs requiring
that written notice be given to the police 24 hours before any march.
Frank Ditto, one of the leaders of the marches, was present in
court when the injunction was granted. On August 22 he called a
10:00 a.m. press conference to state his belief that the injunction was
an unwarranted usurpation of his constitutional rights and to announce
his intention to defy the court injunction. A copy of the injunction was
served on Ditto at 10:30 a.m; and on the same day he conducted a
march without giving prior notice to the police.
Ditto was charged with contempt of court. As a defense, he
maintained that the temporary injunction order abridged his constittitional rights and therefore was void. The circuit court ruled that the
only proper questions before it were jurisdiction of the parties, jurisdiction of the subject matter, and whether the injunction had been
disobeyed. The constitutionality of the injunction was held not rele*
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86 Ill App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (lst Dist.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028
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vant to the charge of contempt. Ditto did not refute the evidence of
disobedience, was convicted of contempt, and sentenced to six months
in jail. He appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.
The second case, Board of Junior College District 508 v. Cook
County College Teachers Union, Local 1600,2 originated in a teachers
strike. The union, which had been recognized as the exclusive representative for the faculty, and the board which operated junior colleges
in the Chicago area, were negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. Progress was slow and on November 30, 1966, the board obtained a temporary injunction which prohibited the union from striking
or picketing. Nevertheless, Norman Swenson and others picketed after
a strike was called. The strike was settled and the board's attorney
moved to dissolve the temporary injunction. The trial judge refused
to dissolve, however, and ordered the board's attorneys to commence
contempt proceedings against Swenson and the union. The board's
attorney declined to proceed further, and when the trial judge requested the state's attorney to prepare contempt proceedings, that office
also declined. The trial judge then appointed a member of the bar
as amicus curiae to investigate.
In April of 1967, the amicus curiae recommended that the union
and Swenson show cause why they should not be held in contempt of
court. A hearing was held and the amicus presented evidence of
breach of the injunction. The union was convicted of contempt and
fined $5,000; Swenson was convicted of contempt, sentenced to 30
days in jail, and fined $1,000. Both appealed, arguing that the temporary injunction was void and erroneous because it violated the Constitution and certain statutes. The appellate court affirmed.
The next case, Board of Education v. Kankakee Federation of
Teachers, Local 886,3 was a result of a teachers strike in Kankakee
County. On April 25, 1969, the union communicated an immediate
intent to strike to the board and picketing began the next morning.
On Saturday April 26, at 5:45 p.m., the board's attorney, without attempting to give notice to the union, secured a temporary restraining
order which prohibited the union from striking and picketing. The
sheriff served the order on the union members that evening, but the
strike continued.
On the 29th of April the board initiated contempt proceedings
against the union. During the time between the board's petition to
show cause and the hearing on it, the court held a hearing and issued
a preliminary injunction. Union members attended the hearing but
did not participate, and ignored the preliminary injunction as they had
2.
(1970).
3.

126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d 125 (1st Dist.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 998
46 111. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d 18 (1970).
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the temporary restraining order. Hearing on contempt for breach of
the temporary restraining order was had on May 5. The union moved
to dismiss, arguing that the order violated due process because it was
granted without notice or a hearing. The trial judge denied the motion, heard evidence, found certain union members in contempt, fined
the union $12,000, fined several union members and sentenced several
of them to 60 days in jail. The strike ended. Those who were
convicted of contempt appealed and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
The fourth appellate decision, County of Peoriav. Benedict,4 was
a consequence of a nursing home strike. The union and the Peoria
County Bel-Wood Nursing Home were at loggerheads. The superintendent of the nursing home concluded that a strike was likely to begin
on November 30, 1968. On November 27, the Wednesday before
Thanksgiving, the union's staff representative, Harold Z. Benedict, and
the union's secretary-treasurer were notified that a hearing on the
county's complaint requesting an injunction would be held on Friday,
November 29. The union did not appear at the hearing. A temporary
injunction which barred the union from striking or picketing the BelWood Nursing Home was awarded to plaintiffs. The union struck at
midnight on November 30 and set up picket lines at the nursing home.
The county began proceedings on December 3. The union filed
motions to dismiss the complaint, to vacate the injunction, and to dismiss the contempt proceedings. Pursuant to an interim order, a work
force was maintained at the nursing home and controlled picketing was
allowed. At a hearing on January 2, 1969, the union's attorney admitted disobedience of the injunction; the court found contempt and fined
the union $2,400; Benedict, $1,500; and 13 employees, $50 each.
Benedict was sentenced to 60 days in jail. On the same date the injunction was made permanent. The employees, the union, and Benedict appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the injunction was
erroneous and vacated it, but affirmed the fines and sentences for contempt.
The final case, United Mine Workers of America Union Hospital
v. United Mine Workers District 50,5 began with a strike vote against
a nonprofit hospital in West Frankfort. The union contract with the
hospital expired on October 31, 1969. The union decided not to work
without a contract, and picket lines were set up at 12:02 a.m. on November 1. At 5:33 a.m. on November 1 the hospital filed a complaint
and the circuit court granted a temporary restraining order which prohibited the strike and picketing. At 7:00 a.m. the order was served
4.
5.

47 I11. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970).
1 Ill. App. 3d 822, 275 N.E.2d 231 (5th Dist. 1971), rev'd, 52 Il1. 2d 496,

288 N.E.2d 455 (1972) (facts taken from appellate court opinion).
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on the union members who were in front of the hospital. The picketing stopped when the order was served but began again at 1:00 p.m.
that afternoon and continued until midmorning the next day.
On November 3 the hospital initiated contempt proceedings. Following a hearing, the circuit court found that the picketing violated
the injunction, held the picketers in contempt of court, and levied
fines totaling $16,270. The picketers who had been convicted of contempt appealed. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed the appellate court and affirmed the circuit court's
finding of contempt.
In all of these cases there is a common thread: an injunction or
restraining order is issued against the defendants; the defendants act
contrary to the injunction; the defendants are charged with contempt
of court for violating the injunction; and the defendant-contemnors
seek to defeat contempt by arguing that there were defects in the underlying injunction. Nevertheless, the courts did not treat each case
the same.
The distinguishable results spring from the collateral bar rule, a
part of the doctrinal apparatus of collateral and direct attack. Contempt is a proceeding collateral to the injunction suit, and the contemnor, when charged with disobeying the injunction, may not argue
as a defense to contempt that the injunction was erroneous, but only
that it was void.' The difficulty is in distinguishing between orders
which are void and subject to collateral attack and those which are
merely erroneous.
As illustrated by the recent cases, Illinois courts apply the collateral bar rule to preclude relitigation of injunction issues in a subsequent contempt proceeding. Even though the injunction which was
disobeyed is asserted to be erroneous, but not void, contempt will be
affirmed, as it was in Benedict.7 If the injunction is void because the
court lacks the power to act, however, voidness of the order may be
shown to defeat contempt.' The distinction between lack of power
or voidness, and mistaken use of power or error turns on the elusive
concept of jurisdiction. Thus, the only issues which will be examined
upon a charge of contempt are whether the enjoining court had jurisdiction over the person of the contemnor, whether the enjoining court
6.

Musgrove v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 274 So. 2d 640, 642 (Ala.

1972); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala, 53, 181 So. 2d 493 (1966), affirmed
with a few variations, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d
340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1st Dist.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1967); Z. CHAFEE, SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 297-380 (1950).
7. See also AMF, Inc. v. International Fiberglass Co., 469 F.2d 1063, 1065
(1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Christie, 465 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Fidanian, 465 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1972); Mathison v. Felton, 90 Idaho
87, 408 P.2d 457 (1965).
8. Ex parte Bryant, 155 Tex. 219, 485 S.W.2d 719 (1956).
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had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and whether the contemnor
violated the injunction or order.' Seldom do the cases contain any
difficult questions about whether the contemnor disobeyed the injunction.1" Instead, the problems arise in the areas of personal jurisdiction,
subject matter jurisdiction, and the civil-criminal contempt distinction.".
Personal jurisdiction is more often assumed than examined. It is
generally held that the defendant in an injunction proceeding must, at
risk of contempt, obey the injunction from the time he has actual notice
of it." Thus, if a person knows of the injunction by service upon him
or otherwise, and proceeds nevertheless to act contrary to it, he may
be held in contempt.' 3 It is irrelevant that the procedure was ex parte
and that the plaintiff neither served nor attempted to serve notice on
the defendant before the injunction was granted.' 4 Furthermore, the
defendant is bound even though he was accorded no opportunity to
litigate the granting of the injunction.'" If a defendant is informed of
an ex parte injunction, he must obey it. Otherwise, because of the col9. City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 349-51, 230 N.E.2d 41, 46
(1st Dist. 1970); Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College
Teachers Union, Local 1600, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 427-28, 262 N.E.2d 125, 129 (1st
Dist. 1970).
10. UMWA Union Hosp. v. UMWA Dist. 50, 1 Ill. App. 3d 822, 275 N.E.2d
231 (5th Dist. 1971), rev'd, 52 Ill. 2d 496, 288 N.E.2d 455 (1972); Carolina Freight
Carriers Corp. v. Local Union 61, 11 N.C. App. 159, 180 S.E.2d 461, cert. denied,
278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 601 (1971); Ex parte Bryant, 155 Tex. 219, 485 S.W.2d
719 (1956).
11. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967); County of Peoria v.
Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166, 170-71, 265 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1970); Board of Junior College
Dist. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 126 I1. App. 2d 418,427,
262 N.E.2d 125, 129 (1st Dist. 1970); City of Chicago v. King, 86 I11. App. 2d 340,
354-55, 230 N.E.2d 41, 48 (1st Dist. 1967). See also United States v. Dickinson, 465
F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Hitchman Coal & Coke v. Mitchell, 245 U.S.
229, 334-35 (1917).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971).
See also United States v. Hall, 472
F.2d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1972); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners of West
Virginia, 442 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (1971) (semble); Backo v. Local 281, 438 F.2d 176,
180 (1970); United States ex rel. Carter v. Jennings, 333 F. Supp. 1392, 1396 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (D. Ala. 1971); United States v. Puerto
Rico Independence Party, 324 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1971); Sumbry v. Land 195
S.E.2d 228, 234 (Ga. App. 1972); Riehe v. District Court, 184 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa

1971); F.

FRANKFURTER

& N.

GREENE, THE LABOR INJuNCTION

123-25 (1930); Dobbs,

Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 249-61 (1971).
13. County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970);
Board of Junior College Dist. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local
1600, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d 125 (1st Dist.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 998
(1970); Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 I11. 2d 439,
264 N.E.2d 18 (1970); City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41
(1st Dist.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1967).
14. UMWA Union Hosp. v. UMWA Dist. 50, 1 Ill. App. 3d 822, 275 N.E.2d 231
(5th Dist. 1971), rev'd, 52 Ill. 2d 496, 288 N.E.2d 455 (1972); Board of Educ. v.
Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d 18 (1970). See
also United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972).
15. Tefft, Neither Above the Law nor Below It. A Note on Walker v. Birmingham, 1967 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 181.
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lateral bar rule, he may be convicted of contempt for acts which he had
a legal right to perform without ever having an opportunity to litigate
the underlying issues.
The question of subject matter jurisdiction presents quite a different problem. The state constitution provides: "Circuit courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters,"1 6 and the legislature has provided that the circuit courts shall have power to grant
writs of injunction.' 7 The circuit court thus has power or subject matter jurisdiction over cases where the plaintiff requests an injunction.
Moreover, the power to decide a case includes the power to decide it
incorrectly. It is irrelevant to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
whether the injunction was unconstitutional 8 or erroneously issued in
the face of the Anti-Injunction Act. 9 Thus, in accord with the collateral bar rule, an injunction not meeting constitutional or statutory
criteria could be expunged, while at the same time a contempt convic20
tion for breaching that erroneous injunction could be affirmed.
According to the Illinois law, an injunction granted by a circuit
court could be erroneous, but almost never void. The circuit court
has power to grant injunctions and this includes the power to grant
erroneous injunctions. The collateral bar rule precludes a defendant
from breaching an injunction and then arguing error as a defense to
contempt. The enjoined defendant's proper course is either to move
to dissolve or modify the injunction, to appeal, or, if time is short, to
request an expeditious stay of the injunction. 21 The rationale for this
rule lies not in doctrine, but in policy. To allow an enjoined defendant
to flout an injunction and then to argue against it in contempt is said
to encourage disrespect for the courts because it allows the defendant
to become judge in his own case.2 2 Thus, when Frank Ditto announced
his conscious intent to defy the court injunction, the issue was not
whether the injunction was constitutional, but whether Ditto could con16.
17.

ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 9.
ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 69, § 1 (1971).

18. See generally Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 344-48; Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 553 n.67 (1970). But see State ex rel.
Superior Ct. v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 73-78, 483 P.2d 608, 611-13 (1971).
19. The Anti-Injunction Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2(a) (1971), provides
that no injunction or restraining order shall be granted in a case involving terms or
conditions of employment.
20. County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970). See
generally Comment, Collateral Attack upon Labor Injunction Issued in Disregard of
Anti-Injunction Statutes, 47 YALE L.J. 1136 (1937).
21. Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439,
264 N.E.2d 18 (1970); Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 362, 380.

22. Board of Junior College Dist. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union,
Local 1600, 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d 125 (1st Dist. 1970) (citing Walker v.
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)). See, e.g., United States v. Fidanian, 465
F.2d 755, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 510
(5th Cir. 1972).
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sciously transgress the court decree. So also, in Cook County College
Teachers, it was not incongruous for the circuit judge, after both the
plaintiff and the state's attorney had rejected the opportunity to act
upon contempt, to appoint another lawyer to charge and convict NorThe court was vindicating its own digman Swenson of contempt."
nity, integrity, and authority, and not furthering any interest of the
parties.
Because preserving respect for the court is the primary reason
for the collateral bar rule, the rule should operate only in criminal
contempt where the judgment is punative and intended to punish and
preserve respect. In civil contempt the judgment is remedial or coercive, and the contempt is usually said to rest upon the underlying decree and to fall with it.24 The distinction between civil and criminal
contempt, unfortunately, is abstract rather than operational and has
not worked very well in practice.2" The already confused distinction
between civil and criminal contempt has been exacerbated by the more
recent cases. In UMWA Union Hospital, the circuit court found the
contemnors to be in civil contempt, 26 but nevertheless levied fines.
The fines could not have been coercive for the disobedience had ceased
before the rule to show cause issued; 27 and it seems clear that the fines,
although denominated civil, were punative and criminal. 8 In Benedict, 13 individual defendants were fined for criminal contempt, but
the fines were to be suspended upon compliance with the permanent
injunction. A determinate sentence, suspended upon the condition
that the contemnor comply with the order, is coercive and blurs, if it
does not extirpate, the distinction between civil-coercive and criminalpunative contempt. 9 These cases and earlier decisions 6 are unfortunate because they confuse the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt, extend the collateral bar rule beyond the reasons for its
existence, deter or prevent the courts from examining the merits of
contempt appeals, and distort the concepts of voidness and subject
matter jurisdiction.
23. See generally Halligan, Enjoining Public Employees' Strikes: Dealing with
RecalcitrantDefendants, 19 DEPAuL L. REV. 298, 299 (1969).

24.

The criminal-civil contempt distinction is made in College Teachers. See gen-

erally Dobbs, supra note 12, at 235-39, 243; United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258,

294-95 (1947).
25. Dobbs, supra note 12, at 246-47. See also, e.g., Emery Air Freight Corp. v.
Teamsters Local 295, 449 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Carter v.
Jennings, 333 F. Supp. 1392 (E.D. Pa. 1971).

The same conduct can be both criminal

and civil contempt. See Mitchell v. Fiore, 470 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1972); Hadnott v.
Amos, 325 F. Supp. 777 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
26.

1 Ill.
App. 3d at 823, 275 N.E.2d at 232.

27.
28.

Id. at 824, 275 N.E.2d at 233.
See Dobbs, supra note 12, at 274-78.

29.
30.

Id. at 244.
Faris v. Fars, 35 Ill. 2d 305, 220 N.E.2d 210 (1966); County of Du Page v.

Molitor, 26 Ill. App. 2d 232, 167 N.E.2d 592 (2d Dist. 1960).
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Subject matter jurisdiction reveals the perpetual irony of the conflict between the romantic imagination and real life; and jurisdiction,
the helpless abstraction, has been persistently manipulated in the procSome federal cases illustrate this
ess of deciding particular cases. 3
tendency. In United States v. United Mine Workers,3 2 the union was
held in contempt for ignoring an injunction. It contended that the
injunction was void because the Norris-LaGuardia Act 3 deprived the
district court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the injunction was not void, but that even if it were void, the collateral bar rule
would preclude relitigating injunction issues in the contempt proceeding as long as jurisdiction were not frivolous.3 4 The Mine Workers
doctrine suffers from a lack of intelligibility,35 and has come in for
some spirited criticism.3 6 Another major case came in 1967 when the7
United States Supreme Court decided Walker v. City of Birmingham.1
A group of black ministers paraded despite an ex parte injunction
and were adjudged in contempt of court. The Alabama Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that if the enjoining court had a general grant
of equity power and achieved jurisdiction over the persons enjoined,
then the defendant who disobeyed the injunction is precluded from
advancing injunction infirmities as a defense to contempt.3 8 The United
States Supreme Court held, in a divided opinion, that the Alabama
rule was permissible state procedure, even in a constitutional case.
Two qualifications were noted. If the "injunction was transparently
invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity, '3 9 the defendant
would be able to ignore it and argue its defects in a contempt hearing.
The second qualification in Walker was practical and procedural rather
than abstract. The ministers had not attempted to modify, dissolve,
or appeal the injunction, but had called a press conference to denounce
Alabama justice and marched in defiance of the injunction. "This
case would arise in quite a different constitutional posture," the majority stated "if the petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had
challenged it in the Alabama courts, and had been met with delay
31.

Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 296-363.

32.
33.

330 U.S. 258 (1947).
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . in-

junction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute."

(1970).
34.
35.

29 U.S.C. § 104

330 U.S. at 309-10 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 376-77; C. WRIGHT,

LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 16 (1970).
36. Cox, The Void Order and the Duty To Obey, 16 U. CH. L. REV. 86 (1948);
Watt, The Divine Right of Government by Judiciary, 14 id. 409 (1947).
37. 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The case is superficially similar on the facts to King.

Rev. Martin Luther King was a defendant to both injunctions, but a contemnor only
in Walker.

38.

Walker v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala. 53, 181 So. 2d 493 (1966).

39..

388 U.S. at 315.
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or frustration of their constitutional claims." 4
This may be called
the requirement of a timely challenge. The defendant, even though
the injunction was secured ex parte, must first attempt a direct review of the injunction. 4 Thus the pristine subject matter jurisdiction
wall was breached on both sides: in Mine Workers, the Supreme
Court held that there were some void orders which must be obeyed;
and in Walker, the court inferred that there were two classes of valid
though erroneous orders which could be disobeyed with impunity.
Before returning to subject matter jurisdiction in Illinois, it is well
to note one other development in the federal law of constitutional procedure. In Carrollv. Princess Anne,4 2 the United States Supreme Court,
on direct appeal, held unconstitutional an ex parte injunction against
a National State's Rights Party rally. In regulating protected expression, the Court reasoned, prior restraints are to be eschewed; and,
to assure accuracy in the adjudicating process, if it is possible to give
notice to the defendants before they are enjoined, the plaintiff must
"invite or permit their participation in -the proceedings. '4 3 The Carroll case has, however, proven to be easy to distinguish; and while the
principle is commendable, in practice it has not protected many defendants from ex parte injunctions.4 4 The Illinois response was typical.
In Kankakee Teachers, the temporary injunction to stop a strike in
progress was granted ex parte and there was neither notice nor an attempt to give notice, although the strikers were manning picket lines.
The order was served, but the strike continued. Some of the strikers
were convicted of contempt. Affirming, the Illinois Supreme Court
distinguished Carroll as not applicable to picketing which is not dogmatically equated with constitutionally protected speech, and as not
binding precedent for an illegal strike which was in progress when
enjoined.4 5 The injunction procedure, moreover, was not even before
40.

Id. at 318.

See on this point Judge Brown's opinion in United States v.

Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir. 1972).
41. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRFSSION 385 (1970);
Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1481, 1562 (1970);
Brantigan, Constitutional Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEO. L.J. 1513,
1521 (1972); Cox, supra note 36, at 113; Rodgers, The Elusive Search for the Void
Injunction: Res Judicata Principles in Criminal Contempt Proceedings, 49 B.U.L.
REV. 251 (1969); Note, Collateral Attack of Injunction Restraining First Amendment
Activity, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1097 (1972); Note, Injuria Non Excusat Injuriam:
UnconstitutionalInjunctions and the Duty To Obey, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 51.
42. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
43. Id. at 180. The instances when notice need not be given axe variously stated
by the Court. Compare id. at 180 with id. at 182-83, and id. at 184-85.
44. See, e.g., Duke v. Texas, 327 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Tex. 1971); Go v. Peterson,
14 Ariz. App. 12, 480 P.2d 35 (1971); Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120 (Fla.

1970); Kleinjans v. Lombardi, 52 Hawaii 427, 478 P.2d 320 (1970); Mechanic v.
Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. App. 1970). Contrast United Farm Workers Organizing Comm. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 556, 94 Cal. Rptr. 263, 483 P.2d 1215
(1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Costa v. Boley, 441 Pa. 495, 272 A.2d 905 (1971).
45. 46 Ill.
2d at 444, 264 N.E.2d at 21. See Mins v. Duval County School Bd.,
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the contempt court-the contemnors were precluded by the collateral
46
bar rule from advancing injunction issues in the contempt proceeding.
In other words, before Carroll will be applied, the defendant must
have engaged in legal, pure speech, the injunction must have issued before the enjoined event, and the defendant must attack the injunction
directly, by motion to dissolve or modify or by appeal.
This was the law of Illinois as it stood before the fifth district
appellate court decided Mine Workers Hospital. The rules relating to
subject matter jurisdiction were simple and fairly clear; the courts adhered to the collateral bar rule precluding relitigation of injunction issues in contempt; the distinction between civil and criminal contempt
was not always observed; and the collateral bar rule was, perhaps incorrectly, applied to both criminal and civil contempts. Mine Workers Hospital was an appeal from an order holding a group of strikers
in contempt for picketing in breach of a circuit court injunction. The
appellate court held that the injunction was void because the circuit
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and reversed the contempt order. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court
and affirmed the contempt. An analysis of the dialogue between the
appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court provides a vehicle for
examining the confusion of subject matter jurisdiction and collateral
attack.
The appellate court's first reason for reversing the contempt order
was that because of the Anti-Injunction Act, the circuit court had no
power to enjoin peaceful picketing in a legal labor dispute.4 7 A literal
reading of the decision would indicate that the appellate court believed
the Act to be jurisdictional. If that is the intended meaning, it is, as
the Illinois Supreme Court held, incongruent with past cases.4 8 The
Illinois Supreme Court was right.49 Injunctions which are granted but
should not be granted are not void, but erroneous, and these injunctions are not correctable by collateral attack in contempt. The AntiInjunction Act does not void a labor injunction that has been mistakenly granted. Had the legislature intended the Act to be jurisdictional and an injunction to be void, it could have used either those
words or their equivalents in order to override the jurisdiction of the
circuit court which is clearly set out by statute and the state constitution. 50 The Act is intended to channel an inquiry, not to limit the jurisdiction of the courts.
350 F. Supp. 553 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
46. 46 Il. 2d at 445, 264 N.E.2d at 22. See also Anderson v. Dean, 354 F.
Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
47. 1 111. App. 3d at 825-26, 275 N.E.2d at 233-34.
48. 52 Ill. 2d at 501-02, 288 N.E.2d at 458.
49. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2(a) (1971).
50. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 9; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 1 (1971). Cf. Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 6, at 371.

No. 2]

DUE PROCESS IN INJUNCTION PROCEDURE

231

Professor Chafee argued that the line between power and nonpower should be a bright line rather than tortured and obscure: A trial
judge should be able to tell quickly and easily which cases belong in
his court and which do not. This so-called "bright line policy" is intended to prevent lengthy trials and difficult decisions which do not
bind anyone; to prevent judges from refraining from deciding cases
because of an excess of caution; and to prevent concentrating scarce
judicial resources on jurisdictional issues rather than the merits of the
cases. 5 1 Jurisdictional questions should not turn on minor issues which
involve many factors. Jurisdictional issues, moreover, should be able
to be disposed of before the trial judge turns to the merits. It is wasteful to try the entire case and then decide that the court had no jurisdiction.
[O]nly a strong demonstration of necessity can justify extending
the list of defects of power so as to include errors which, by
their very nature, often cannot be established satisfactorily until
the trial of the merits has been going on for days and weeks.
• . . Power ought to be settled at the beginning of a suit. A
horse should be disqualified before the race starts and not after
a photo finish. 52
The inquiry under the Anti-Injunction Act is complex and requires evidence on the merits. Only peaceful picketing is protected;
and the circuit court has power to enjoin mass picketing and violence.5"
Only legal strikes are protected under the Act; and the circuit court has
the power to enjoin illegal strikes. 4 When purpose or intent is at issue, it is necessary to take evidence. 55 Must the court take evidence
to decide whether the strike is legal or illegal, violent or nonviolent,
the picketing is massed or informational, and, if it decides that the
strike cannot be enjoined, decline jurisdiction? The circuit court from
the outset either has jurisdiction or does not have it. Jurisdiction
"never drops out of the sky into the middle of a case weeks after suit
was begun." 56 The limits on the injunctive power of the circuit court
are not susceptible of easy determination at the outset, but rather re51.

Z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 312.
52. Id. at 317-18.
53. Eads Coal Co. v. UMWA, Dist. 12, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1082, 269 N.E.2d 359
(1971); Twin City Barge & Towing Co. v. Licensed Tugmen's & Pilots' Protective
Ass'n of America, 48 Ill. App. 2d 1, 197 N.E.2d 749 (1st Dist. 1964); General
Elec. Co. v. Local 997, UAW, 8 Ill. App. 2d 154, 130 N.E.2d 758 (3d Dist. 1955).
54. Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (may
enjoin strike by custodial employees of school district). Redding is explained some2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375
what in Peters v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 44 Ill.
(1969). See also School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 299 A.2d 441, 443
(R.I. 1973) (may enjoin illegal strike).
55. Cielesz v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 25 Il.App. 2d 491, 167
N.E.2d 302 (2d Dist. 1960); Simmons v. Retail Clerks Int'l, 5 111. App. 2d 429,
125 N.E.2d 700 (4th Dist. 1955).
56. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurry 372 (1950).

LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1973

quire the taking and weighing of evidence. Therefore, to assert that
the Anti-Injunction Act is jurisdictional is to ignore the practical realities and conceptual underpinning of the "bright line policy." Questions
concerning which strikes are inside and which are outside the Act go
to the merits of the individual case and affect erroneousness, but are
not proper limits on subject matter jurisdiction. The appellate court
was wrong in holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and the Illinois Supreme Court correctly reversed.
Another reason given by the appellate court for striking down the
injunction was that it came under the exception in Walker v. Birmingham because it was "transparently on its face invalid. '5 7 The Illinois
Supreme Court dismissed this argument with the statement "we do not
believe any such transparent invalidity was present in the case at
bar." '
The Illinois Supreme Court was correct. The Walker opinion
discussed when error of constitutional magnitude in an injunction could
be collaterally asserted, and assumed that the court which had granted
the injunction had jurisdiction or power. In Mine Workers Hospital,
the appellate court held that the circuit court had no power to grant
the injunction and then went on to assert transparent invalidity, a basis
for allowing collateral attack, as a reason for lack of power in the issuing court. If the appellate court was correct about jurisdiction, transparent invalidity is superfluous. The circuit court either had jurisdiction or it did not; and the seriousness of error has no bearing on the
question of jurisdiction. The appellate court could have stated it in
the alternative: the order was void but if the order was not void, then
it was erroneous and this erroneousness was of sufficient magnitude
(transparently invalid) to allow the error to be asserted on collateral
attack.
Even if "transparently invalid" is properly a reason for the result
reached, it remains to determine whether the order was transparently
invalid. In early November 1969, at the time of the injunction in Mine
Workers Hospital, the law of Illinois was that strikes against nonprofit
hospitals were illegal and could be enjoined; 59 and it was not until more
than three weeks after the operative facts in Mine Workers Hospital
that the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and held that these strikes
57. 1 Ill. App. 3d at 826-27, 275 N.E.2d at 234-35. The appellate court also
found that exception in United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). This seems
incorrect. The Walker case applied the collateral bar rule but stated that this barrier
might be lowered if the injunction was transparently invalid. 388 U.S. at 315. United
States v. UMWA held that an injunction must be obeyed, even though the issuing court
had no jurisdiction, unless the asserted jurisdiction was "frivolous and not substantial."
330 U.S. at 293.
58. UMWA Union Hosp. v. UMWA Dist. 50, 52 Ill. 2d 496, 501, 288 N.E.2d 455,

458 (1972).
59. Peters v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 107 Ill. App. 2d 460, 264 N.E.2d
840 (1st Dist. 1969).
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were legal and could not be enjoined.6" Moreover, the weaknesses
which were said by the appellate court to raise the error in Mine Workers Hospital to the level of transparent invalidity flowed from failure to
give notice to the defendants when the injunction would constitute a
prior restraint. 6 ' The Illinois Supreme Court had earlier recognized
the difference between the rally in Carroll v. PrincessAnne62 and picketing, and held that Carroll only requires enhanced procedural protections in pure speech cases and not in speech plus picketing cases. 63
The Illinois Supreme Court had also held that Carroll defects related
to error and not jurisdiction, and were not of sufficient magnitude to
be heard on collateral attack.6 4 The appellate court holding and the
Illinois Supreme Court reversal open up the problem of what exactly
is meant by the term "transparently invalid" as an exception to the general rule against collateral attack on injunctions. That the level of
frivolous or transparent invalidity is somewhat above simple constitutional error appears from the Walker case because there the injunction
was unconstitutional in two respects: the ordinance which the injunction redacted was invalid on its face; 65 and the injunction had been
granted ex parte without the hearing later required by Carroll. Thus,
while the Mine Workers Hospitalinjunction might have been erroneous,
it is hard to say that it was transparently invalid.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT LAW

The injunction in Mine Workers Hospital was granted at 5:33
a.m. No attempt was made to give notice to the pickets who were on
the public sidewalks adjacent to the hospital. There was no hearing:
the complaint was filed and the order was signed the same minute.
The order forbade picketing and the strike. The picketing did not
stop, and the picketers were charged with contempt. 66 The evil, in
this writer's opinion, is the ex parte injunction against peaceful picket60.

Peters v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 44 Ill. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375

(1969).
61.
62.
63.

1 Ill. App. 3d at 827, 275 N.E.2d at 235.
393 U.S. 175 (1968).
Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264

N.E.2d 18 (1970).

See also United States Steelworkers v. Alabaster Line Co., 286

Ala. 489, 242 So. 2d 658 (1970)

(illegal picketing can be enjoined without a hearing

if decree permits legal picketing); Go v. Peterson, 14 Ariz. App. 12, 480 P.2d 35
(1971) (political speech in Carroll not analogous to movie theater); Kleinans v.
Lombardi, 52 Hawaii 427, 478 P.2d 320 (1970) (Carroll inapplicable to conduct).
64. Board of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed. of Teachers, Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439,
See also, e.g., United States v. Puerto Rico Independence
264 N.E.2d 18 (1970).
Party, 324 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1971).

65.

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51,

153 (1969).

When

Walker was decided, the Alabama Court of Appeals had declared the ordinance unconstitutional, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 43 Ala. App. 68, 180 So. 2d 114 (1965).
66. 1 Ill. App. 3d at 824, 275 N.E.2d at 232-33.
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ing. The appellate court's result, reversing contempt, is surely correct.
What end could be served by punishing those strikers who picketed
peacefully for a few hours? But, in order to release the strikers from
contempt, the appellate court mercilessly tortured the doctrine of subject matter jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court straightened out
the law of jurisdiction, but at the price of affirming a contempt order
which should have been reversed.
The appellate court's mistake is an example of what Chafee called
judicial thinking on two levels. 6 7 On one level the appellate court asked
elaborate, technical questions about the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. On the other level, the court asked a more basic question
about the wise conduct of human affairs: Who should have the last
word on the question of whether these pickets should be punished?
It answered this question correctly. But, in order to reverse the punishment for contempt, the collateral bar rule required the appellate
court to void the judgment. The order was voided in order to accomplish a wise practical result-freeing the strikers-but the concept of
subject matter jurisdiction suffered. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the contempt and revealed more concern for consistent doctrine
than compassion for the striking hospital workers.
The solution Chafee advocated was a stay or supersedeas and a
quick review. 68 This has also been suggested by the United States
Supreme Court.69 At times, an expeditious appeal or stay can provide
relief from an incorrect or oppressive order.7" Sometimes, however,
the enjoined conduct is in progress, 71 or the order is mandatory and
requires affirmative conduct. Furthermore, a stay is not always
granted; an appeal is time consuming and costly; a reversal may come
too late to help the defendant; and, if the events which gave occasion
to the conduct have passed, a reversal will often be a practical victory
for the plaintiff. 72 Furthermore, to enjoin a strike is to break it, for
time is of the essence and once the momentum is lost, the strike is
over. 73 A stay or speedy review cannot be the full answer when the
enjoined conduct is in progress or about to begin: ex parte procedure
67. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 56, at 334-35.
68. Id. at 358-63.
69. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 319 n.12 (1967), cites Alabama
Supreme Court Rule 47 which allows the court to accelerate filing dates for appellate
papers.,
70. See, e.g., United States Servicemen's Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d 44 (4th Cir.
1971); cf. Southeastern Prods. Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1972).
71. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970).
72. See, e.g., Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947); Kenyon v. City
of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946).
73. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 330 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). See also School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 299 A.2d 441 (R.L

1973); Watt, supra note 36.
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combined with the collateral bar rule requires the defendant to cease
or abandon his conduct at the price of contempt, even though the order
74 ex
may be incorrect. No matter how careful the appellate court is,
parte injunctions can and will create hardship for the defendant.
New solutions must be sought. Discussion generally has bogged
down in subject matter jurisdiction, 75 or concentrated on first amendment problems. 78 The focus of inquiry, however, could be shifted from
the first amendment and subject matter jurisdiction to jurisdiction over
the person. The rest of this article will deal with the idea that many
ex parte injunctions are void because the court lacks jurisdiction over
the person of the defendants.
Ex parte injunctions are interlocutory procedural devices designed
to preserve the plaintiff's rights until a hearing can be scheduled. 7 7 An
injunction is a conservative instrument which halts or prevents conduct.
The stated purpose of the ex parte injunction or temporary restraining
order is to preserve the status quo-"the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the controversy. '78 In the rush of events,
however, it is often difficult to identify the precise time the status quo
existed.
There are two related reasons for ex parte procedure in injunction cases. The first relates to certainty. The subject of the litigation
must be preserved so that the court will have something to pass upon
when the full hearing comes and so that the plaintiff will be able to
enjoy the fruits of his victory. 79 The second relates to speed and secrecy. There is thought to be a class of defendants who, upon receipt
of notice, may destroy, remove, or sell the subject of the litigation or
otherwise render full relief impossible."'
8
Ex parte practice in injunctions is ancient and almost universal. 1
It has been approved by the United States Supreme Court,8 2 and respected commentators.8 ' There has also been criticism and it is felt
74.

See, e.g., Schaefer v. Stephens-Adamson Mfg. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 310, 183

N.E.2d 575 (1st Dist. 1962).

See also United Steelworkers of America v. Seminole

Asphalt Ref. Co., 269 So. 2d 28 (Fla. App. 1972).
75. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 56, at 296-380. Cox, supra note 36.
76. See, e.g., Note, 45 S. CAL. L. REV., supra note 41.
77. See generally Nussbaum, Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions-The Federal Practice, 26 Sw. L.J. 265 (1972); Developments in the Law
-Injunctions, 78 HARv.L. REv. 994, 1055-61 (1965).
78. Schlicksup Drug Co. v. Schlicksup, 129 Ill. App. 2d 181, 187, 262 N.E.2d 713,
716 (3d Dist. 1970).
79. Developments in the Law, supra note 77. See also Nussbaum, sup~a note 77.
80. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 126 (Fla. 1970).
81. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 182 n.189 (1930).
Early federal practice did not allow ex parte injunctions. Id.
82. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
83. See, e.g., Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 IARv. L. REV.

518, 537 (1970).
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by many that some kind of notice is preferable to ex parte practice.8 4
There are two reasons for requiring notice. The first relates to the
concept of status quo. There are times when orders are intended to
end temporary emergencies rather than to lead to a hearing in the
future. If the order succeeds in ending the temporary emergency,
there will be no need for further proceedings. Ex parte procedure in
emergencies is commonly used to suppress dissent,85 and to break
strikes.8 6 It is argued, accordingly, that if the order does not lay the
foundation for effective final relief, but is effective final relief, then
the status quo rubric is inapposite and not very utilitarian. 87 In fact
these orders are final orders. 88
These -final orders obtained ex parte and backed up by the collateral bar rule create a superstructure which contains a latent but
imposing potential for injustice, and the second reason for giving notice
relates to this possibility. Justice Brennan has commented that ex parte
injunctions were "obtained invisibly and upon a stage darkened lest it
be open to scrutiny by those affected." 8 9 Ex parte procedure, by definition, excludes a hearing; the facts will be found from a sworn petition or affidavits.9" Verification is the only guarantee of accuracy.
Disinterested equanimity cannot be expected of plaintiffs; the request
for an injunction will often be presented to the judge in a fashion which
is at best one-sided because of the possibility of excessive zeal, mistake,
selection, and omission. Ex parte procedure, therefore, creates an incentive for partisanship and chicanery. Allegations and affidavits are
"a wholly untrustworthy class of proof." 9' 1 "It has long been recognized that 'fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.' "92 Ex parte procedure frustrates
84. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Transport Workers Union, 278 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1960);
Arivida Corp. v. Sugarman, 259 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1958); Ford Motor Co. v. Cottingham, Inc., 228 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1955); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers
Ass'n, 299 A.2d 441 (R.I. 1973); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 81,

at 224.
85. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
86. School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, 299 A.2d 441 (R.I. 1973);
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 81, at 63-65.
87. State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (1971).
Cf. Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
88. Rendleman, Legal Anatomy of an Air Pollution Emergency, 2 ENviR. AFFAmRS

90, 107-08 (1972); Note, S.
89.
ion).

CAL.

L. REv., supra note 41, at 1088.

Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 346 (1967)

90.

(dissenting opin-

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 60, § 3-1 (1971).
91. Great Northern R.R. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 416 (D.N.D. 1923). See also
Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Organization, 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1971); United States Servicemen's Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d 44, 46 (4th Cir. 1971);
T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7 (1966);

F.

FRANKFURTER

92.

& N.

GREENE,

supra note 81, at 65, 188-89.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).

No. 2]

DUE PROCESS IN INJUNCTION PROCEDURE

237

the adversary system because in the absence of both parties there is a
greater chance that the facts will be ascertained inaccurately, the law
will be applied incorrectly, and the order will be drafted incautiously.
These reasons, which relate to accuracy in the litigation process, may
be termed pragmatic reasons to oppose ex parte procedure.
There are also a priori reasons to ,avoid ex parte procedure. In a
democracy, the state exists to promote the welfare of individuals and
the emphasis is upon private decisionmaking, unfettered by government
interference.9" It seems fundamental to a democracy that people who
are affected by a decision should participate in making it. If a person
is ordered to cease conduct by an injunction thrust upon him as an
accomplished fact, it appears to be government by fiat.94 He has had
no opportunity to participate in the process which curtailed his conduct; and even if the order is correct under law, it is odious and unpalatable because of the way it came about,9 5 and it is likely to cause
resentment toward the decision, the decisionmakers, and the decisionmaking process. This bitter and disaffected reaction to ex parte procedure relates to the principle of legitimation: Decisions will be more
readily complied with if both sides have had ample opportunity to state
their position and persuade others to adopt it.96 The judicial process
has a symbolic function. Professor Paul Carrington has observed that
the decisionmaking process is "a ritual which celebrates our common
concern for the right of each individual to insist that official decisions
affecting him be made subject to general principles of humane quality
93. "Mhe prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of
law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional and political history, that
we place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental interference."
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972); cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371

(1971); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
94. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1832 (3d ed. 1940); Dobbs, Contempt of Court:
A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 250 (1971).
95.

F. JAMES,

CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2 (1965).

See also F.

FRANKFURTER & N.

GREENE, supra note 81, at 52-53; Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure 1, 18 ILL. L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1923); Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that Are

Civilized To Promote Justice that Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1971). It might
be argued that defendants are more aggravated by the fact of the injunction than the
method of securing it.

Some of the anger at having been had is no doubt due to the

fact of the injunction, but it is reasonable to conclude that ex parte procedure exacerbates the outrage. See Rendleman, supra note 88, at 103-04.
96. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12

(1966). The legitimation concept is related to the political science concept of legitimacy which "involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the soci-

ety." .S. LiPSET, POLITICAL MAN 64 (1963). Access to decisionmaking institutions
seems to be basic to a feeling that the institutions are legitimate ones. Id. at 65, 67.
That notions of illegitimacy may stem from denial of access to decisions is relevant to
a study of ex parte injunctions is almost too obvious to state.

Lipset couples the sym-

bolc value of legitimacy with the instrumental value of effectiveness which relates to
how things work. Id. at 64. Lipset's legitimacy-effectiveness analysis is close to the
priori-pragmatic analysis discussed herein.
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enforced by high officials personally familiar with his problem."97
When the adversary process is short circuited at the outset, these values
are frustrated. On the other hand, in a judicial proceeding where both
sides are allowed a full opportunity to present a case there is a better
chance that the loser will think that an adverse result, even though not
to his liking, is a legitimate decision.
In deciding whether there is a need for an adversary presentation,
therefore, it is necessary to consider both the accuracy of the adjudicating process and the impact on those who would be required to submit
to a decision which they had no part in shaping. Full publicity is the
best guarantee against abuse; a result following full publicity will be
both a more accurate decision and one more easily accepted by the
loser.
The policy reasons underlying the collateral bar doctrine are preserving respect for the courts, preventing defendants from appointing
themselves judge in their own cases, and resolving disputes in a neutral
forum rather than upon the initiative of private and interested parties.
There is surely something to preserving respect, and the system runs
better if some wisdom is presumed in judges-it reinforces the judges
and reassures the rest of us. Respect for the courts, however, should
not be allowed to degenerate into a complacent belief that the personnel of our court system possess intelligence approaching omniscience.
Some who support ex parte practice impute an almost supernatural quality to the judicial function. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
a decision that defendants must obey orders which the judge had no
power to grant, 98 stated:
The conception of a government by laws dominated the thoughts
of those who founded this Nation and designed its Constitution,
although they knew as well as the belittlers of the conception that
laws have to be made, interpreted and enforced by men. To
that end, they set apart a body of men, who were to be the depositories of law, who by their disciplined training and character
and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of private interest
may reasonably be expected to be "as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit." So strongly were
the framers of the Constitution bent on securing a reign of law
that they endowed the judicial office with extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no matter how exalted his public
office or how righteous his private motive, can be judge in his
own case. That is what courts are for."
97.

ABA Proceedings, Improving Procedures in the Decisional Process, 52 F.R.D.

51, 78 (1971).
98.

curring).

United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258, 310-12 (1947)

252, 289 (1941).

99.

(Frankfurter, J., con-

Contrast Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
330 U.S. at 308-09.
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Many disagree and reject the idea that judges are something more
than normal people. Professor Richard Watt, commenting on United
States v. United Mine Workers and Justice Frankfurter's encomium to
judges, stated:
The history of the assumption and usurpation of power by
the judiciary in America is a familiar story. But this doctrine,
. . . is as flagrant an instance as our constitutional history provides. . . The flavor of long-discarded divine right which
has lingered around the concept of contempt has finally emerged
as a doctrine-the doctrine that the Court can do no wrong. 0 0
Judges, in his view, should receive no more respect than they earn.
As the Mississippi Supreme Court recently observed: "Respect for
courts is that voluntary esteem the public has for judicial rectitude.
Punishment for contempt will not insure or preserve respect, for it
cannot be compelled."' 10 ' Thus, insisting that allowing disobedience
of incorrect orders encourages disrespect for correct orders and
requiring that incorrect decrees be obeyed without possibility of challenge may diminish rather than preserve respect for the courts. 0 2 The
collateral bar rule, it has been charged, requires misplaced respect for
the person of the judge who may be wrong, while the proper respect
is to some higher law.10 3 The defendant-contemnors in many of the
collateral bar cases have been opponents of the existing order, exponents of social change, and authors of social ferment.' 0 4 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, have been the voice of order and continuity;
their desire is to preserve the status quo. The defendant groups cannot be expected to pay the same obeisance to judges, courts, or court
orders as the plaintiff groups. No prefabricated formula, in the view
of the defendants, should be allowed to impede social change or to prevent the courts from deciding issues on the merits.
The emphasis to be placed upon preserving the status quo and
100.

Watt, The Divine Right of Government by Judiciary, 14 U. Cm. L. Rav. 409,

448 (1947).

101.
102.

Boydstun v. State, 259 So. 2d 707, 709 (Miss. 1972).
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 384, 385 (1970);

Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HIv.L. REv. 626, 635 (1970).
103. See the arguments of the ministers in Walker, 388 U.S. at 323-24; and of
Frank Ditto in King, 86 111. App. 2d at 348, 230 N.E.2d at 45 (1967).
104. See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 102, at 286-90. Union president and

civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph put it this way:
"Demonstrations are the hallmark of every revolution since the birth of civilization. .'. .
These are the outbursts, . . . the manifestations of deep convictions
about the evils that people suffer. While they sometimes take the form of some irrational upsurge of emotionalism, they come from the fact that the peoples are the victims of long-accumulated wrongs and deprivations. Therefore, these are an outburst
and an outcry for justice, for freedom. And there is no way . . . to stop these demonstrations until the cause is removed, and the cause is racial bias, the cause is exploita-

tion and oppression, the cause is a secondclass citizen in a first-class nation ...
This is the reason for the civil rights revolution." Quoted in J. Anderson, Profiles
(A. Philip Randolph Ill), New Yorker, Dec. 16, 1972, at 40, 73-74.
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maintaining respect for the courts is a matter of ideology and the question is not so simple as whether respect can be purchased with deprivation. The order or decree of the court is presumptively correct until
dissolved, modified, or overruled on appeal. Obedience, therefore, is
required. One who would contest the constitutionality of a criminal
statute is, however, not precluded from doing so following a violation. 10 5
Thus the collateral bar rule is an anomaly in the law.'0 6 Chief Judge
John Brown of the Fifth Circuit offers pragmatic and institutional reasons for distinguishing obedience to statutes from obedience to judicial
decrees:
The problem is unique to the judiciary because of its particular
role. Disobedience to a legislative pronouncement in no way
interferes with the legislature's ability to discharge its responsibilities (passing laws). The dispute is simply pursued in the
judiciary and the legislature is ordinarily free to continue its function unencumbered by any burdens resulting from the disregard
of its directives ...
On the other hand, the deliberate refusal to obey an order
of the court without testing its validity through established processes requires further action by the judiciary, and therefore directly affects the judiciary's ability to discharge its duties and
responsibilities. Therefore, "while it is sparingly to be used, yet
the power of courts to punish for contempts is a necessary and
integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on
them by law. Without it they are mere boards of 1arbitration
07
whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory.
The collateral bar rule should be used only when required by the reasons asserted in support of it; it should be08relaxed when countervailing
interests of sufficient weight are interposed.1
An interest which must be considered is the value of litigating issues on the merits. To command respect, court orders should be adjudicated in a procedural process which will allow them to be worthy of
respect. Respect for court orders is marginal in ex parte procedure.
First, the order is more likely to be defective. The court has heard
only one side before finding facts, applying the law, and formulating
the order. Second, the injunction is the product of an atmosphere
105.
senting).

Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 327 (1967) (Warren, C.J., disIn fact, he might be required to violate the criminal statute to test its con-

stitutionality.

See, e.g., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Becker v. Thompson,

459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972).

106.

See generally Note, supra note 105.

See also United States v. Fidanian, 465

F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1972); accord, Mitchell v. Fiore, 470 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1972).

107.

United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 510 (5th Cir. 1972).

108. In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971). Also note the result in United
States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1972). But see the Dickinson
case on remand, 349 F. Supp. 227 (D. La. 1972).
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which might seem to be one of subterranean intrigue and is thrust
upon the defendant like a fiat. The defendant has had no opportunity
to participate in the adjudicating process and may justifiably feel overreached. Defendants in injunction suits should be treated not only with
fairness, but with the assiduous appearance of fairness. Ex parte procedure only exacerbates their estrangement from constituted authority.
IV.

A PROPOSAL: NOTICE AND HEARING

This article has examined the reasons for ex parte practice and
the policy behind the collateral bar rule. When considered in relation
to democratic values and the goals of our procedural system, both the
collateral bar rule and ex parte practice were found guilty of excesses
and held capable of creating serious injustice. The need is to construct
a doctrinal mechanism which will allow the courts to function yet not
require obedience to court orders which are unworthy of respect. The
article turns next to the recent due process cases which have brought
the propriety of ex parte injunction procedure out of the region of
generalities and into one where decisions are inevitable. It will be argued that all injunctions and orders with practical finality must be
preceded by notice and a hearing or else be void.
Defendants to an ex parte injunction do not have an adequate interest to impose the dictates of due process, it could be argued, because
the order is not final and is subject to a motion to dissolve or modify.
This argument was considered in Fuentes v. Shevin,' 0 9 which concerned summary prejudgment repossession of household chattels purchased by time payments. The Supreme Court held that even though
the repossession was not final, the purchaser's interest was not vitiated
because his bare possessory interests in the chattels were enough to call
due process onto the field before the chattels were taken. The Court
observed that even a temporary deprivation of property falls under the
fourteenth amendment."'
In the Illinois cases here considered, the
defendants' property interests were not hampered. Instead, the injunctions circumscribed the defendants' liberty interests: their freedom to
locomote, to exhort, to inform, and to apply economic and other pressure. These interests in conduct or liberty would seem to be equally protected by the due process guarantees. In addition, it is clear that when
a court issues an order which prohibits conduct already in progress,
the order has practical finality. The defendant must alter his plans
to conform his conduct to the order or pay the price of contempt.
Time is a perishable commodity; in a strike or a demonstration, timing
109. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
110. Id. at 85. See also Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Pervis v. LaMarque Independent School Dist., 446 F.2d 1054
(5th Cir. 1972).
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and momentum are particularly vital. If nothing happens, the status
quo can, from the plaintiff's position, be said to have been preserved.
But if conduct in progress is stopped or if planned conduct is prevented, then, from the defendant's vantage point, the status quo has
been modified and his conduct has been restricted and hampered. In
injunction cases, the due process guarantees should be held to attach
when the defendant's interest in his conduct is such that the order or
injunction has practical finality.

Problems which arise in deciding whether an injunction or order
has practical finality could be partially solved by looking to the cases
which determine whether an order is sufficiently final to be appealable. 11 ' The key to the inquiry is whether the order affects the defendant's interest in his present conduct. Any order which deters or
inhibits the defendant's interest in his present conduct is a decision
on the merits as to that conduct and has practical finality." 2 An or111. Construction Laborers, Local No. 438 v. S.J. Curry & Co., 371 U.S. 542,
550 (1963); Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Wood,
295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961). See generally C. WEIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 101,
102 (1970); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 403 (1968); Annot., 19 id. 459.
Ex parte orders have frequently been held unappealable. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.
3d at 439-44, 480-83. This factor, however, is not relevant to the question of whether
the order has practical finality because in determining practical finality the question is
whether the order affects significant interests and hence should not be ex parte.
112. Some understanding of the admittedly imprecise concept of practical finality
can be attained by comparing two recent ex parte theatre-obscenity injunctions. In
State v. Gulf States Theatres, 270 So. 2d 547 (La. 1972), on the basis of a sworn
statement of facts in a petition, the judge enjoined, pending a hearing, the showing of
the motion picture. This order had practical finality. The theatre could not exhibit
the picture at all pending the first adversary hearing five days later. Nothing happened and, in that sense, the status quo was preserved, but as to the defendants, the
order was final for five days and the order was permanent for the same time. The majority, however, observed incorrectly that the order was temporary and to preserve the
status quo. 270 So. 2d at 552, 554-55 (McCabb, C.J., concurring). The dissents
are persuasive. 270 So. 2d at 555-60, 562-78. See especially Justice Barham's discussion on ex parte procedure in a civil obscenity case. Id. at 568-70. On the
other hand, in United States v. Little Beaver Theatre, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.
Fla. 1971), the government scheduled a hearing on whether a search warrant should
be issued. In the meantime, because the theatre management was aware of possible
trouble, an ex parte order was obtained. The order restrained "all interested parties
from 'disposing of, relinquishing possession of, or in any manner cutting, altering,
splicing, destroying or mutilating subject motion picture 'Turned on Girl"....'
Id. at 120. This order did not have practical finality for it did not deter present or
planned conduct. Nor did the order interfere with expression in any meaningful sense.
To the contrary, the decree insured that if showings of the movie continued, expression
would continue unabated. Thus the principle of Carroll v. Princess Anne was not
violated. The preliminary order, accordingly, preserved the subject of litigation for
the court to pass upon since the court could hardly decide obscenity if the questionable segments of the print were in the projectionists' wastebasket.
So conceived, the practical finality concept is similar to the Solicitor General's argument in Walker v. City of Birmingham that the Supreme Court should not apply the
collateral bar rule but instead consider the merits because the injunction therein did
not preserve the status quo. Selig, Regulation of Street Demonstrators by Injunction,
4 -LHAv. Crv. P rrs---Crv. LIB. L. REv. 135, 150 (1968).
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der with practical finality impairs a substantial right of the defendant,
and that is enough of an interest to call the due process guarantees into
operation.
If the defendant has a sufficient interest to give rise to due process
protection, then the question must be: what sort of procedure does
due process require before an injunction with practical finality is
granted? Due process is a concept which varies in relation to the particular set of interests at stake." 3 Notice and a hearing in advance
of an adjudication which may affect defendant's rights are core values
in our adversary system and have been said to be the very essence of
procedural due process. 11 4 The defendant should have notice, and he
should receive it far enough in advance to allow him to prepare." 5
Practical problems may arise, and flexibility must be considered as
well as the plaintiff's need for haste. The Constitution requires no
more than "notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections,"' 1 6 and the plaintiff
must, in any event, inform the defendant of the accomplished fact of
the injunction in order to bind him. In many cases telephonic notice
to the attorney for the adverse party should be enough." ' The constitutional issues do not turn on formalities but revolve around fairness" 8
and actual notice. 1 9 The plaintiff should give notice as soon as he
can and not just before he leaves for the courthouse or the judge's
home.
There are, it could be argued, countervailing interests sufficient to
outweigh the need for notice. The plaintiff, arguably, has a need for
speed and efficiency and in many ex parte cases a desire to prevent
the defendant from destroying or concealing the subject property.
These arguments, however, were considered in the context of summary
-repossession and rejected. The due process clause was "designed to
113. Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Bronson v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Colligan v. United
States, 349 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972).

114. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); F.
12.1 (1965).

JAMES,

CIVIL PROCEDURE §

115.

See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
116. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See also
Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
117. Advisory Committee's Note to 1966 Amendments to Rule 65(b), 39 F.R.D.
124-25 (1966). FED. R. Crv. P. 65(b)(2) requires the plaintiff's attorney to make a

record of what he has done to give notice.
118. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Nowell v.
Nowell, 384 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1967).
119. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972); Weaver v. O'Grady, 350 F. Supp.
403 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
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protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy which may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre
ones."' ° In dealing with the need for prompt action to prevent the
debtor from destroying or concealing the goods, the Supreme Court
observed that the statutes were too broad to encompass that purpose
and that "no such unusual situation is presented by the facts of these
cases."''
An allegation of immediate and irreparable injury is necessary for an ex parte temporary restraining order.12 2 Nevertheless, in
the absence of an adversary process, there is no realistic check on the
truth of the allegations; and the state has abandoned effective control
over private use of state power and "acts largely in the dark.' 23 That
a quick motion to dissolve or modify is available 24 could be argued
to obviate the need for notice in advance. But it must be remembered
that we are dealing with conduct in progress or about to begin. The
order binds the defendant from the time he has actual knowledge of
it; and if the order has practical finality, the reasoning in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'25 should control: "I think that due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice'
and 'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least
the probable validity, of the underlying claim . . . before [defendant]
can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use."
Notice, it could also be argued, is obviated because, if the injunction is improper, the defendant may recover on the bond. This argument must also be rejected. First, the government which has been
the litigant in many of these cases is not required to post security, 28
and any remedy against the bond is generally held to be the exclusive
remedy. 1 27 Even where the plaintiff is a private party the argument
for recovery on the bond must be repudiated. To allow a plaintiff to
post bond and prevent a defendant's conduct at the cost of later paying
damages is to allow a plaintiff to buy up the defendant's right to liberty. "[N]o later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact
120. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
121. 407 U.S. at 93.
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971). See also FED. R. CIv. P. 65(b);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele, 29 Cal. App. 3d 681, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1972).
123. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972). But see Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Waegele, 29 Cal. App. 3d 681, 686, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914, 917 (1972).
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971) (2 days or less).
125. 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969).
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 9 (1971). See also FED. R.Civ. P. 65(c).
127. Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 316 (D. Mass.
1966); Alabama Mills v. Mitchell, 159 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C. 1958); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1955);
Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARv. L. REV. 333
(1959).
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that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due
process has already occurred." "[The bond] is no replacement for
the right to a prior hearing that is the only truly effective safeguard
against arbitrary deprivation of property.' 1 28 Plaintiffs should not be
allowed to enjoin now and pay later.
Thus, it is clear that notice should be required before granting an
injunction which has practical finality. The purpose of notice, of
course, is to allow the defendant to participate in the process of adjudicating the issues; 2 ' and the notice should inform the defendant of
the basis of the plaintiffs charges, the relief asked, and the time and
place of the hearing. The manner and style of the hearing may vary
with the interests at stake and the time available.'
If defendant's
constitutional rights are at issue, a more rigorous hearing might be required."' If the event sought to be enjoined is in progress, perhaps a
less formal hearing may be permissible." 2 The hearing should be the
best the circumstances allow and provide some guarantee of the truth
of the plaintiff's assertions, the correctness of the law applied, and,
if an order is necessary, some assurance that the order be tailored to
the legitimate interests of both sides."' The hearing or adjudicative
process must not be a farce" 34 but must provide a real test."15 In Fuentes, the United States Supreme Court condemned a process in which
the creditor alleged his conclusions on a form and posted a bond before the writ which allowed him to take possession was issued by a
nonjudicial state official. Ex parte injunction practice is somewhat
different: the plaintiff must proceed upon affidavit or verified complaint charging specific facts which give rise to immediate and irreparable loss.136 The injunction will be granted by a judge; and, if the
government is the plaintiff, no bond is required."17 The practical dif128.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1972).

See also Gross v. Fox, 349

F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
129. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Organization, 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971); Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1971); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
130. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 & n.21 (1972).
131. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1481 (1970).
132. "[D]ue process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing 'appropriate to
the nature of the case.'" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972).
133. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 179, 182-84 (1968). See also State ex rel.
Matalik v. Schubert, 204 N.W.2d 13 (Wis. 1973).
134. Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Organization, 446 F.2d
353 (5th Cir. 1971).
135. See the discussion of the nature of the hearing required and the standard of
proof in Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 89-91 (1972).
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971). See People ex rel. Scott v. Aluminum
Coil Anodizing Corp., 132 Ill. App. 2d 168, 268 N.E.2d 53 (2d Dist. 1971).

137.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 9 (1971).
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ferences may not, however, be always that great. The allegations, even
if sworn, prove only the strength of the applicant's own belief in his
rights."3 8 Since there are forms available for ex parte injunctions, the
drafting process may be no more than filling in blanks. The adjudicative role of the judge is frequently attenuated, and the injunction may
be granted almost automatically. The underlying reality is the absence of a right to be heard. An adversary hearing, it has been said,
is the constitutional norm.8 9 If the process does not provide any realistic check on the self interest of the plaintiff, the title of the official
who is purported to act for the state should not affect the right to a
hearing. 4 ' Sworn oral testimony which is subject to cross examina142
tion should be preferred 14 ' and in some cases may be necessary.
"[Wihen a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense,
and when the State must listen to what he has to say, substantively
unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property interests can be
43
prevented."'
There are good arguments for requiring notice for all injunctions
with practical finality and holding that failure to give proper notice
deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant who may
ignore the order and prove lack of personal jurisdiction in any subsequent proceeding. The ex parte injunction is not fully worthy of respect. It is formulated in a process which calls both its accuracy and
its legitimacy into question. A jurisdictional requirement for notice
before granting injunctions with practical finality will surmount the
collateral bar rule in ex parte cases where it should not apply and preserve it to operate within its proper scope in fully litigated cases where
it should apply. Because an ex parte injunction with practical finality would be void, there would be no need for the defendant to
hasten to the courthouse to interpose a timely challenge. Therefore,
as a practical matter, plaintiffs will give notice. Requiring notice will
allow the adversary system to function, decrease the number of overreaching injunctions, and enhance the legitimacy of the adjudicating
process and the court system. The plaintiff will be deprived of an
opportunity to act speedily and secretly but if successful, will attain
the moral force of a decision on the merits. The court will decide
cases more on the real issues and less on a one-sided presentation.
138. In Fuentes the Court observed that the ex parte procedure may even provide
an incentive to state facts incorrectly. 407 U.S. at 83 n.13.
139. Crow v. California Dep't of Human Resources, 325 F. Supp. 1314, 1318
(N.D. Cal. 1970).
140. Cf. Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762, 766 (D. W. Va. 1972). But see
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele, 29 Cal. App. 3d 681, 687, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914, 917

(1972).
141. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
142. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
(E.D. Wis. 1972).

143.

407 U.S. at 81.

CI. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
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The proposed jurisdictional requirement for notice and hearing
for injunctions with practical finality rests on lines of cases: the
Carroll case and other cases which require enhanced procedural
protection before controlling expression-related conduct with an
injunction; the due process cases which require notice and a hearing
when a constitutionally cognizable interest is affected by state action
or adjudication; and the line of constitutional cases which void a judgment which was issued without notice. 1 4 The notice requirement in
Carroll would be expanded by the interest concept of the due process
cases from a narrow group of first amendment cases to include all injunctions which have practical finality. And, because of the collateral
bar rule in injunction cases, the due process-notice rules must be jurisdictional rather than erroneous to carry out their purpose. Illinois already has the beginning of a practical finality-personal jurisdiction rule.
There are cases which hold that if notice should have been given but
was not, an injunction will be reversed for that reason alone without
inquiring further. 1 45 All that would be required is to solidify the point
at which notice is required at practical finality and to apply a jurisdictional or voiding analysis when notice is not given.
Jurisdiction and due process are highly ambiguous terms. They
are recondite abstractions which must be applied in a myriad of practical situations. They describe a variety of legal rules, and their meanings change with time and the context. The general problem considered here is the need, while preserving respect for the court, for rapid
relief from oppressive decrees. The barrier has been the collateral
bar rule. Jurisdiction of the court, while a useful concept, is overdoctrinal and out of touch with the underlying procederal reality and,
therefore, a capricious variable to allow an escape from the harsh dictates of the collateral bar rule. One who considers the changes in due
process in the last 10 years is struck with one feature. More emphasis
is placed upon fairness and procedural protection for a variety of interests and the trend is decidedly away from ex parte and summary procedure. 14 6 As the courts, by the use of due process, have extended
and expanded the adversary principle into spheres which had previously escaped its influence, many ancient redoubts which were once
considered unassailable have precipitately crumbled. 4 '
144. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Polansky v.
Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
145. Schaefer v. Stephens-Adamson Mfg. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 575
(1st Dist. 1962). Illinois also has cases which take up the problem of when notice is
unnecessary. These cases include UMWA Union Hosp. (S. Ct.), and General Elec.
Co. v. Local 997, UAW, 8 Ill. App. 2d 154, 130 N.E.2d 758 (3d Dist. 1955).
146. See, e.g., Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Colligan v.
United States, 349 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
147. See, e.g., Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Attorney General, 470

248

LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1973

The collateral bar rule should not be a formula to be universally
and unthinkingly applied. A question which may reasonably be asked
to limit the scope of the collateral bar rule is whether the injunction
was formulated in a process which provides some guarantee of accuracy
and legitimacy. If the Draconian operation of the collateral bar rule
is to be restricted, the due process cases provide a frame of reference
with a reasonable relation to the policies sought to be advanced. A
due process rule which requires, at the cost of personal jurisdiction,
such notice and a hearing as are practical under the circumstances before granting an injunction with practical finality, limits the collateral
bar rule with proper regard to those variables. Yet the analysis suggested here in no way invalidates the collateral bar rule and does not
consign it to the limbo reserved for trivialities but preserves it, somewhat shorn, to operate within its proper sphere.
V. A REEVALUATION OF THE ILLINOIS CASES
In City of Chicago v. King a hearing was held before the court
granted the injunction which required demonstrators to inform the police before demonstrating. Contemnor Ditto was present at the hearing
and made no objection thereto. 148 Three days later Ditto called a
press conference and announced his intent to defy the injunction. The
injunction was then served on Ditto who nevertheless demonstrated in
defiance of it.
In Ditto's contempt hearing, the collateral bar rule was properly
applied to preclude, as a defense to contempt, arguments that the injunction was unconstitutionally void. The injunction did not have
practical finality for the August 22 demonstration does not even seem
to have been planned when the injunction was granted on August
19th. If respect for the courts is to have any meaning, it must mean
that ligitated decisions should be obeyed pending dissolution, modification, or review. 14 9 Instead of calling a press conference to denounce
the court and the injunction, Frank Ditto should have made a motion
to dissolve15 or mcdify the assertedly unconstitutional injunction.
In Cook County College Teachers a temporary injunction against
a strike was granted on November 30. A strike was called that day
F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
148. 86 Ill. App. 2d at 347, 230 N.E.2d at 44.
149. It could be argued that the emergency obviated the need for notice. The
See The Supreme Court,
writer, however, thinks notice should be required.
1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 88-89 (1972); MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp.
1334, 1337-38 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443,
448 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 110 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972); C. v. Superior Court,
29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (1973).
150. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, § 15 (1971).
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and picketing began the next. Contemnor Swenson knew of the injunction when he spoke at-the meeting on November 30 and later picketed in breach of the injunction. After the strike was settled, the plaintiff moved to dissolve the injunction and disdained to press contempt
charges against Swenson. The circuit judge requested the state's attorney to bring contempt but that office declined and eventually a member of the bar was appointed to investigate. Swenson was charged
with contempt and the collateral bar rule was applied.' 5 '

There may or may not have been notice and an adversary hearing; the order was titled a temporary injunction which should, but need
not always follow notice; 152 and the reported case does not indicate
whether there was notice. 155 If there was notice and an opportunity
to present matter at the hearing, then the collateral bar rule was properly applied. If, on the other hand, there was neither notice nor opportunity to present defenses at an adversary hearing, the question is
whether the injunction had practical finality. If an injunction with
practical finality was granted without notice, then, following the analysis suggested here, the court did not obtain personal jurisdiction, the injunction was void, and Swenson could show the voidness to defeat
contempt. This would be true even though the plaintiff was entitled
to .an injunction against an illegal strike, 5 4 and the defendant-contemnor knew of the injunction. The purpose of the practical finalitypersonal jurisdiction analysis is to require adversary adjudications before an injunction is granted; the clarity of the law might lead to an
attenuated hearing, but not to no hearing at all, and actual knowledge
after the injunction is granted is not legal notice before the hearing.' 5 5
The exact time sequence does not appear in the reported opinion;' 5 6 and whether the injunction had practical finality cannot be
stated with any certainty. The issue is whether, the defendants being
available for notice, the injunction proscribed, circumscribed, or materially affected either conduct in progress or conduct which was so
imminent that the injunction would prevent or alter the conduct before
there was a reasonable and practical chance to modify or dissolve it.
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the injunction had practical finality and could only issue upon notice and some kind of adversary
151.
153.
154.

126 I11.App. 2d at 426, 262 N.E.2d at 128.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3 (1971).
126 II1. App. 2d at 424, 262 N.E.2d at 127.
Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).

155.

Cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).

152.

If the injunction was granted

following notice to the union and a hearing was held although Swenson was not notified to be present, and the injunction read so as to bind the defendant's officers, and

Swenson had actual knowledge of the injunction before he violated it, then the collateral

bar rule could be properly applied. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 3-1 (1971); Dobbs,
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proceeding. Whether the plaintiff delayed his request for the injunction until the last moment is a question which should bear upon the
question of practical finality. If the plaintiff, knowing that he will
seek an injunction, waits until right before the planned strike to request the injunction, that would militate in the direction of declaring
the injunction to have practical finality. The purpose of the practical
finality-personal jurisdiction analysis is to prevent plaintiffs from delaying until the eleventh hour and fifty-ninth minute to petition for an
injunction and, by the same token, to force the issues early into an
adversary context.
In Kankakee Teachers, the defendants were engaged in an enjoinable strike and the plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order.
There was neither notice to the defendants nor an attempt to give notice. The order was served upon the defendants but the strike continued. Two days later the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. The injunction was granted following a hearing. Defendants
appeared at the hearing but did not participate. The strike continued.
with contempt for violating the temporary
Defendants were 15 charged
7
restraining order.
The contempt conviction for breach of the temporary restraining
order should not stand. The ex parte order forbade conduct in progress. The defendants, or some of them, were manning a picket line
and thus available for notice. There must have been a moment between the decision to seek an injunction and the time the injunction
was actually requested when the plaintiffs could have telephoned or
otherwise notified the defendants. The temporary restraining order
thus had practical finality; and following the analysis suggested here,
because there was no advance notice, there was no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendants and the order was void. It should be added
that the plaintiffs did not lack a remedy. The preliminary injunction
was granted after a hearing at which defendants appeared. While the
injunction had practical finality, it was preceded by an adversary proceeding. Disobedience of the preliminary injunction was contempt,
and the collateral bar rule could have been properly applied to preclude
defenses to the injunction in the later contempt hearing. The defendants had an opportunity and an incentive to litigate those issues during
the hearing on the preliminary injunction and, having not seen fit to
do so, the court may refuse to hear those issues later. 5 " Both the
plaintiff and the defendant may be required to litigate before rather
than after the event.
In County of Peoria v. Benedict, a strike of nursing home employees was likely on November 30. The plaintiff notified the de157.
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fendants on November 27 that there would be a hearing November
29th on a request for an injunction against the strike. The method of
giving notice was by telephone in the afternoon and by service in the
evening. Defendants did not appear at the hearing on the 29th, and
a temporary injunction prohibiting the strike was granted and served
before November 30. The strike began on November 30. Defendants were
charged with contempt for breaching the temporary injunc159
tion.
Contempt in this case was properly affirmed. According to the
proposed analysis, the injunction might have had practical finality because it was granted on the day before the planned event. There was,
however, notice both formal and informal; and, therefore, the court
attained jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Defendants
elected not to appear at the hearing, did not request a continuance to
prepare, and, after the injunction was granted, refrained from taking
advantage of Illinois' liberal provisions to move to dissolve.1 60 Instead
they consciously chose to flout the commands of the injunction. The
defendants had an opportunity and incentive to litigate and, therefore,
the collateral bar rule was appropriately applied to preclude relitigation
in contempt.
The difficulty in Benedict springs from the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court that the injunction was erroneous and should not have
been granted. The injunction was vacated, but the contempt was affirmed.' 61 Thus, the contemnors are punished for breaching an order
which they should not have been required to obey and which would
have been reversed on direct appeal. The decision of the circuit court
to grant the injunction was, however, presumptively correct; and pending the appeal, no court had declared or held the injunction to be erroneous. To give effect to the policy of respect for the courts and to
prevent litigants from appointing themselves judge in their own case,
judicial orders must be tested in the courts in an orderly fashion. Only
if the basic concepts of due process and jurisdiction are ignored in the
granting process, may the defendants ignore an injunction with impunity: this is the basic policy underlying the distinction between lack
of power and mistaken use of power. There are also sound practical
reasons for arguing before rather than after violating an injunction.
If the defendants had appeared at the November 29 hearing, there
would have been a better chance that the circuit judge would rule in
their favor as the Illinois Supreme Court later did. Instead, their arguments against the injunction were advanced to the circuit judge a month
later. The circuit judge, at the later hearing, was asked to repudiate
159.
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a decision he had previously made. His injunction had been ignored.
He was also presented with evidence of roofing nails thrown by the
striking defendants on the driveway of the nursing home while volunteers were moving aged and infirm patients to another location. It does
not require a deep understanding of human psychology to know that
under these circumstances the circuit judge would be somewhat reluctant to dissolve the injunction.
The last case is Mine Workers Hospital. Pickets began patrolling
the plaintiff's hospital at a little after midnight. The picketing was orderly and peaceful. At 5:33 a.m. the same morning, a complaint was
filed and a temporary restraining order was granted. No notice was
given to the defendants. The order was served on the defendants at
7:00 a.m. Picketing ceased but began again in the afternoon and continued until the next day. The defendants were charged with contempt for disobeying the temporary restraining order.
Following the analysis suggested here, the contempt convictions
should be reversed. The injunction prohibited conduct in progress
and therefore had practical finality. It was awarded without notice
and hearing although the defendants were available for notice. Applying the practical finality-personal jurisdiction analysis, the court did
not achieve jurisdiction over the person of the defendants; and the injunction was void. The defendants could ignore the putative exercise
of judicial power with impunity and assert its imperfections in any
subsequent proceeding. The appellate court was correct in holding
that the injunction was void, but following the suggested analysis, the
reason-lack of jurisdiction of the court-is incorrect. The Illinois
Supreme Court was right in holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, but further analysis along the lines suggested here leads to the conclusion that the circuit court did not attain
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants. The practical finalitypersonal jurisdiction analysis is not doctrinal and abstract like subject
matter jurisdiction, but responds to procedural realities. The plaintiff
frustrated the adversary process. While the papers were being drafted
or before, the union officers could have been called or the pickets told
of the imminent request for an injunction. The plaintiff passed up
that opportunity and instead secured an ex parte injunction against
peaceful and, in retrospect, legal picketing. No realistic social goal
is advanced by requiring obedience to such an order; and the practical
finality-personal jurisdiction analysis releases the defendants from contempt without damaging the concept of subject matter jurisdiction.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The practical finality-personal jurisdiction analysis does not
change the result in many cases, but more often puts the result on an-
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other basis. It is more in accord with the adversary nature of our legal
system and the requirements of due process than the existing doctrine.
Legal changes in past years demonstrate conclusively that it is not possible to conceive a legal rule which is regarded with such universal
approbation as to make the discussion of alternatives to it an, idle
pastime. This article has suggested expanding due process and personal jurisdiction into equity procedure.
The Illinois Supreme Court has written one healthy addition to
the law of personal jurisdiction' 6 2 and might well write another. The
result could be fewer clandestine injunctions but more honesty in litigation and a respect less ostentatious but more sincere.
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